TRADE AND JUSTICE: LINKING THE TRADE
LINKAGE DEBATES

FRANK}. GARCIA*

"!think we get very tangled up when we say, 'What is our hu
man rights policy and how does it interact with our trade policy?. . I
do not believe that human rights should be a key element oftrade pol.
,1
tcy ....
.

1.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the linkage between international trade and
various other aspects of social life and concern, or as it is com
monly referred to, the "trade and
" phenomenon, has been the
subject of increasing attention within academic and policy circles. 2
__
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1 Claudia Dreifus, Ready for Takeoff, N.Y. TIM ES , Aug. 17, 1997, § 6
(Mafazine), at 30 (quoting Philip M. Condit, C.E.O., Boeing Company).
Trade linkage is not a new phenomenon, J?articularly with regard to the
link between trade and labor standards. See Virgmia Leary, Workers R ights and
International Trade, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 175, 182-85
(Tagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (examining the link between
domestic labor standards and international competitiveness asserted in nine
teenth century labor reform debates); Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objec
tives and the Multilateral Trade Order, in THE WTO AS AN lNTERJ."'l'ATIONAL
•
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·The response from the trade community to such linkages has not
been one of unalloyed welcome. 3 However, rather than respond
to the multitude of issues and problems being linked to trade in

ORGANIZATION 213 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998), reprinted in 19 U. PA. J.
INT'L EcoN. L. 201 (1998) (noting links between employment, balance of pay
ments issues, and fair labor standards recognized in 1947-48 conference leading
to the Havana Charter and in the Charter itselQ. However, in the last five
years the literature devoted to these and other linkages has mushroomed, with
the trade and environment link arguably leading the way. See, e.g. , DANIEL C.
ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Free TYade, Fair TYadeJ
Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT 'L L.J. 459 (1994). Other
recognized or asserted linkage fields include: human rights, see, e.g. , James F.
Smith, NAFTA and Human R ights: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
793 (1994); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement
Mechan ism for Basic Human R ights: A Proposal for A ddition to the World Trade
Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT 'L L & POL'Y 1 (1996), development, see} e.g. ,
Bartram S. Brown, Develo ing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N.
ILL U. L. REV. 347 (1994 , competition law, see e.g. , Eleanor M. Fox, Toward
World A ntitrust and Mar et A ccess, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997), intellectual
property, see, e.g. , Frank J. Garcia, Protection ofIntellectual Property R ights in the
North A merican Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case ofRegional Trade Regu
lation, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 817 (1993), and culture, see, e.g. , John
David Donaldson, "Television Without FrontiersJJ: The Continuing Tension Be
tween Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity , 20 FORDHAM INT'L
L .J. 90 (1996); W. Ming Shao, Is Th ere No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade
and Cul tura l Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT 'L L. 105 (1995), to name a few. See
generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade andJJ: Recent Developments in Trade Policy
and Scholarship-A nd Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 Nw. J. INT 'L L.
& Bus. 759 (1996-97) (assessing recent linkage scholarship).
3 Some links, like investment and intellectual property, have been readily
received by the trade community, as is evidenced by their inclusion in modern
trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), see North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, chs.
11, 17, 32 LL.M. 639, 670, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures ("TRIMS") and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS"), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31; 33 LL.M. 81 (1994). However, other links to areas such as the
environment, human rights, and competition law are resisted, see} e.g.1 Steve
Charnovitz, The World Trade Organ ization and Social Issues, 28 J. WORLD
TRADE 17, 24 (1994) ("The issues of environment and labour are often reviewed
rather negatively by the trade camp."); Fox, supra note 2, at 10-12 (noting that
the United States resists the linkage between trade and antitrust law); Smith,
supra note 2, at 806-17 (charting U.S. reluctance to embrace disciplined unilat
eral human rights linkages); Spencer W. Waller, The Internationalization ofA n
titrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 344-45 (1987) (noting that interna
tional attempts at integrated transnational comoetition law are generally
ineffective, with the United States playing an ambtvalent role), and cautionary
notes are sounded about linkage in general. See, e.g. , Roessler, supra note 2, at
14-15 (arguing that such linkages undermine both the trade order and attain
ment of the desired domestic policy objectives).

�
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the manner that a ship captain might rail against a sudden increase
in barnacles,4 the trade law and policy community should wel
come this abundance as a sign of the increasing prevalence and
impact of trade law throughout all aspects of the societies of coun
tries engaged in trade, economic integration, and international
economic relations generally. This dramatic increase in the quan
tity, scope and reach of international economic law is often re
ferred to as the '"international economic law revolution,"' 5 and
the trade linkage phenomenon is one aspect of it.
As international economic law increases in scope and effect, it
will become increasingly important to define which issues, prob
lems, and questions are legitimately within its jurisdiction, and
how such issues are to be decided. As international economic re
lations grow more sophisticated, cooperative, and legalized, the
rules and decisions of international economic law encroach more
and more on other areas of social concern, such as environmental
p rotection, labor law, development assistance, and non-economic
human rights. Are these other areas of concern alien to interna
tional economic law, and are the linkages and conflicts among
these issues and traditional trade l aw and policy mere " border
conflicts," conflicts at the margin ? Or are they central, even con
stitutive, of modern international economic law? And how shall
these issues and conflicts be decided?
It is in this context that recognition of the role of justice in in
ternational economic law can make a contribution to the analysis
" debates. A re-examination of the classical
of the "trade and
roots of the Western concept of j ustice, i . e. , Justice as Right Or
6
der, and the relationship between justice, or morality generally,
4

Roessler exhibits a note of weary frustration by stating:
Many of the proposals to pursue environmental objectives through the
multilateral trade order have features that resemble those of past failed
linkages between trade policy instruments and domestic policy objec
tives. Again proposals are made that would permit the use of trade
measures in the pursuit of policy objectives that cannot be attained ef
ficiently with trade policy instruments. And, again, the hoped-for
cross-fertilization is hkely to turn into cross-contamination.
Roessler, supra note 2, at 15 (emphasis added).
5 See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 33 , 36 (1996).
6 This Article confines itself to the moral and political tradition that traces
its ancestry to classical Greece. Outside of the West, other traditions explore
fundamental questions of social order under different rubrics, such as li or
dharma. See generally SURYA P. SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND
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and law, suggests that, in fact, we must consider the claims of jus
tice when we t ry to talk about international economic law .
Moreover, as this Article will seek to illustrate, certain p roblems
in international economic relations, including t rade linkage prob
lems, can usefully be examined as problems involving the often
conflicting claims of justice in the context of international eco. 1 aw . 7
nomiC
Section Two of this Article introduces the concept of justice as
a sort of "linkage" itself, joining o rder with value in legal and so
cial thought, and outlines how justice as "Right Order" is related
to the analysis of international economic law . 8 Section Three ap
plies this view to the "trade and
" debate, suggesting how such
an analysis could contribute to our understandin g of trade linkage
problems. As the title of this Article suggests, such an examina
tion reveals that the question of j ustice is actually implicit in the
many "trade and
" linkages currently under discussion. U n
derstanding how this is so may contribute to improving the ques
tions being asked, and perhaps suggest what the answers might
look like.
__

__

2.
2.1.

JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW

justice as Right Order

In the Western tradition, thinkin g about justice and its rela
tion to law is as old as organized political life, i ndeed as old as the
tradition itself. 9 In Protagoras, Plato writes that a sense of justice

INTER.l\IATIONAL LAW (1996) (surveying Western, Chinese, Indian, and African
ap proaches to social order). It may be that in these traditions such concepts

play an analogous role to the concept of justice, linking order to value in social
life, but that is a question left for another day.
7 P hi l i p Nichols suggests that many trade disputes, and in particular dis
putes involving linkage issues, conceal underlying conflicts in societal values.
See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658, 659-61

(1996).
8 This Article does not develop or adopt a substantive conception of jus

tice, for example, a Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. The Article aims,
rather, to suggest how the concept of justice might function in our analysis of
international economic law.
9 See, e.g., CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 191 (2d ed. 1963) (noting that the problem of the
relation of law to justice is central to the evolution of the philosophy of law).
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is a prereqmslte to living a civic life, to living in community.10
Why? Because the non-violent resolution of disputes, a corner
stone, if not the sine qua non, of civic life, requires that losing par
ties understand outcomes as "right," as consistent with fundamen.
tal. va 1 ues. 11 I n ot h er word s, as "JUSt. "
Over 2,000 years later, we find social psychologists stating, in
modern parlance, essentially the same point. Klaus Scherer, in his
introduction to an interdisciplinary study of justice research,
writes that justice, understood as social outcomes justified by re
course to principles accepted by the community, is a basic and in
2
dispensable principle for any kind of human social association. 1
This assertion relies on the grounds that human beings exhibit a
powerful emotional response to the perception of injustice that no
social system can afford to ignore.
The notion of social outcomes, then, is essential to any mean
ingful concept of justice.1 3 When we speak of j ustice, however,
we speak of social outcomes not in a descriptive sense, but in an
evaluative or justificatory sense. In other words, we speak of the
acceptability of outcomes. 14 If we consider an outcome j ust, we
consider it acceptable, and its acceptability involves reference to
particular criteria . Thus our notion of justice is quite closely
linked conceptually and etymologically to justification. 1 5
The particular criteria by which the acceptability of an out
come is evaluated will depend on the theoretical framework used
for the analysis, and on the discipline posing the general ques10

See PLATO, PROTAGORAS 20-2 1 (Benjamin Jowett & Martin Ostwald
trans., Liberal Arts Press 1965).
11
See id.
12
See Klaus R. Scherer, Issues in the Study of Justice, in JUSTICE: INTER
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 1-14 (Klaus R. Scherer ed., 1992) .
13 In emphasizing social outcomes, this Article does not mean to deny the
importance to the study of j ustice of the processes of outcome allocation,
known in law and social psychology as procedural justice, to an overall theory
of justice. See John Bell, justice and the Law, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 127 (noting the centrality of procedural justice
to legal writinp on justice); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural justice Research, 1 Soc.
JUST. RES 41 (1987) (surveying contemporary psychological research on proce
dural justice).
14 See John Bell & Eric Schokkaert, Interdisciplinary Theory and Research on
justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 237.
15 See Scherer, supra note 12, at 2; see also SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM,
MODERN THEORIES OF JUSTICE 7 (1996); Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Founda
tions ofLiberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127 (1987) .
.
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tion.16 While a social scientist may study the effects of certain
variables on our evaluations of acceptability, such as the subjective
influence of social representations on individual perceptions of in
justice;17 the effects of status, achievement, power, and social
stratification on the distribution of social goods; 1 8 or the effects of
different principles of distribution on the economic system, 19 it
falls to philosophy, in particular moral and political p hilosophy,
to articulate the substantive moral principles by which we judge
the acceptability of individual and social behavior.
Moral and political p hilosophy are concerned with the order
we bring to our social relations, both on the level of i ndividual
decisions and relationships, and in terms of the basic structure of
our social institutions. 2 0 P hrased in terms of the acceptability of
outcomes, moral and p olitical philosophy provide certain modes
of justification, namely, in terms of moral and political n orms, for
individual decision-making and social organization.
The classical roots of our tradition of political p hilosophy
yield two fundamental, related, but significantly diffe rent starting
points on the nature of the concept of justice: the Platonic and
the Aristotelian.2 1 While neither explicitly replaces the other, and

16 Disciplines which have studied the question of justice include: philoso
phy, law, psychology, sociology, and economics. In each discipline, the j ustifi
cation of outcomes ts studied in a slightly different aspect. See generally Scherer,
supra note 12, at 1 1-14.
1 7 See Kjell Tornblom, The Social Psychology of Distributive Justice, in
JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 177-236
(discussing social psychology).
18
See Wil Arts & Romke Van der Veen, Sociological Approaches to Distribu
tive and Procedural justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, su
pra note 12, at 143-76.
19 See Erik Schokkaert, The Economics of Distributive justice, Welfare and
Freedom, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 651 13 . Scherer notes that, normatively, economic analyses of JUStice may advance
the substantive position that efficiency equals justice. See Scherer, supra note
12, at 10, 12.
20
See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 6
( 1990) . The distinction, never very clear, between moral and political philoso
phy can be expressed as follows: moral philosophy concerns the questions of
what we are to do, and political philosophy concerns that subset of questions
involving what we are to do when state power and authority are involved.
21
I am following Rawls in relying on a distinction between the "concept"
of justice and the many varying "conceptions" of justice, the former consistmg
of "the role which these different sets of principles, these different conceptions,
have in common." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971 ) .
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both in fact are complementary, each emphasizes a different as
pect of justice, and both have had a fundamental influence in
shaping our culture's investigation of justice.2 2
Plato's sense of justice is comprehensive and magisterial. Jus
tice is �i Bht Order, both wit i?- the individual sou and wi �hin
the pohs . - Put another way, 1t 1s the concept of Justice that lmks
the terms according to which social life is o rganized with a theory
.
.
.
o f va1 ue, or w h at 1s "G oo d . " 2 4 Th e "R 1g htness " o f a gtven o rd er
depends on the particular relationship of the parts to the whole,
which depends on other matters including a theory of human na
ture and a theory of value. 25 But the function of the concept of
justice, independent of the substantive conception, is to link the

�

�

Tom Campbell objects to the concept/conception distinction regarding
justice, questioning whether any putative "concept" of justice can truly be neu
tral regarding substantive principles of justice. See TOM CAMPBELL, JUSTICE 56 (1988). However, in proposing his concept of justice as "treatment in accor
dance with desert," Campbell reveals that he has blurred the con
cept/conception distinction and is, in fact, advancing a substantive conception
of justice as a concept of justice. !d. In this Article, I have soug ht to preserve
this distinction in advancing the concept of justice as Right Order, which I be
lieve more closely approximates Campbell's own criteria for a neutral func
tional concept.
22
See FRIEDRICH, sup ra note 9, at 26 (crediting Plato and Aristotle with
together laying the foundation for all subsequent inquiries into law and justice
in the West).
2
3 See id. at 13 (describin g the root of Plato's comprehensive concept of jus
tice in pre-Socratic notions of law as nomos, or sacred custom, which "is the or
der whiCh embraces all").
24 Friedrich acknowledges that for Plato there is a close and essential link
between law and ethics. See id. at 15, 18; see also HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS
JUSTICE? 101 (1957) (noting that Platonic justice rests on the idea of the Good).
25 In other words, the substantive view of justice Plato adopts is a p articu
lar account of the proper order among the elements of society, based on his p ar
ticular view of human nature and th.e Good. In Plato's case, the order advo
cated-his substantive theory of justice-is one of justice as "rational control,"
with the p hilosopher king at the head; the guardians in between; and the arti
sans at the bottom. See PLATO, REPUBLIC, 44le-442d, 444d (G.M.A. Gube
trans., 1992). It is a hierarchy of rational ability and character traits, in which
each takes the place most fitting for his or her particular constellation of abili
ties and traits. Those with the more prized of the Greek virtues-valor and ra
tionality-are accorded pride of place. It is not an egalitarian vision, nor is it
particularly attractive to a modern audience.
Later Platonists such as Augustine would modify the nature of the relation
ships according to more egalitarian principles, while maintaining the funda
mental Platonic insight that justice is Right Order. See Ernest L. Fortin, St.
Augustine, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 180-91 (Leo Strauss & Jo
seph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
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social order to a theory of the desirable state or outcome of social
26
relationships
In oth�r words, the acceptability of the particular
.
social order depends on its resemblance to the Good. 27 Thus , for
Plato, any question concerning the organization of social life can
28
be framed as a question concerning justice.
In contrast, Aristotle 's analysis of justice, while arguably more
influential, is somewhat narrower and more technical than
Plato's . Aristotle's inquiry into justice begins with a distinction
between justice in general as the supreme virtue/9 and wecific
forms of justice, with the latter being his principle interest .
Spe
cific forms of justice and injustice concern aspects of one's social
relations that involve gain, and whether what one has gained one
has gained "graspingly" or in proportion to one's proper share.
Out of this distinction arises the further distinction between
types of specific justice for which Aristotle is best known: the
distributive and the corrective. 31 Distributive justice is "that
which is manifested in distributions of honour o r money o r the
other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share
in the constitution," which may be allotted among its members in
equal or unequal shares. 3 2 This aspect of specific justice thus i n
volves the division of social goods, of goods which can be divided
26

.
d'1scuss1on supra note 21.
27 See Alan Ryan, Introduction to JUSTICE 15 (Alan Ryan ed., 1993) (stating
that, for Plato, Justice holds all the other virtues in place, and in this way is a
mirror for reason itself).
28
See id. at 7 (stating that, for Socrates, justice is inherent in the organiza
tion of the whole, whether the whole in question is the individual soul or soci
ety in general).
This discussion may have particular relevance in connection with the trade
and environment debate. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
29
Aristotle describes general justice, or justice in the broadest sense, as con
sisting of all aspects of one's relationship to one's fellows conducted according
to virtue, and injustice, in this sense, as conducting such relationships in a man
ner contrary to virtue. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION
TO ARISTOTLE, 300, bk. V, ch. 1 (Richard McKeon ed., 1947) [hereinafter Eth
ics]. In this characterization of the concept of justice Aristotle is clearly reflect
ing Plato's views.
30 See id. at 400-02, bk. V, ch. 2.
31 Subsequent commentators on justice generally take this distinction as
their starting point. See Ryan, supra note 27, at 9 (noting that most modern
writers on justice begin with these two distinctions). It ts less frequently re
called that this distinction follows the earlier distinction between general, or
Platonic, justice and specific justice.
32 See Ethics, supra note 29, at 402, bk. V, ch. 2.
see
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or allocated, and which can be divided socially, by custom, opin
ion, informal decisions, and formal allocative mechanisms.33 In
order to evaluate a particular division, one need only identify the
particular conception of justice, the substantive principle which
3
would guide such allocative decisions towards a just result. 4
Corrective justice is a restorative form of justice; of putting
into balance something that has come out of balance because of an
injustice. 3 5 It could be considered the elimination of gain from
acts of injustice. 3 6 If, as a result of voluntary or involuntary deal
ings with one's fellows, a party ends up with either more or less
than what is properly its share of the subject of the transaction, 3 7
Aristotle would say that this is an injustice, and the solution to

33 The notion of division among members of a group or community, or
those who "have a share in the constitution," id., raises the question of whether
this aspect of specific justice applies to any group in which allocation of social
goods occurs, or if some particular type of social or political link, i.e., one that
requires a shared constitution or membership in a polity, is a precondition to
the claims of distributive justice. This issue arises again in the contention that
distributive justice does not apply to trade agreements because, to the extent
they affect such allocations, they do so across polities and do not affect mem
bers of the same polity. Of course, one can argue that trade agreements them
selves form a sort of constitution, creating the relevant type of relationship
among all individuals who are subject to their provisions. See discussion infra
note 6 1 .
3 4 Aristotle's substantive principle of distributive justice is akin to our no
tion of equality or fairness, but like Plato's version, it is not an egalitarian fair
ness. Aristotle did not conceive of a society of equals, but one of p roper shares,
in which ability, economic status, and character should result in what we would
consider an unequal distribution of goods; it could be called proportionate
equality or proportionate fairness. See Ethics, supra note 29, at 402-04, bk. V,
ch. 3.
35 See id. at 404-07, bk. V, ch. 4. Corrective justice is often referred to as
retributive, in that it is associated with criminal punishment, but it is not re
lated tC? mod�r� nC?tions of retribution and is more properly concerned with
correctmg an InJUStlce.
36 Aristotle conceives of corrective justice as applying to what .can be trans
lated as "transactions," both voluntary and involuntary ones. See FRIEDRICH,
supra note 9, at 22 (notin� that this distinction roughly mirrors the distinction
between contract and tort).
37 The proper share here is not according to the merit-oriented proportions
of distributive JUStice, but is more akin to the simple sum of the party's gain less
loss at the start of the interaction, and the change envisioned by the terms of
the interaction itself. See Ethics, supra note 29, at 404-07, bk. V, ch. 4 .
Here again, it i s useful to recall the distinction between the concept of cor
rective Jusuce and Aristotle's substantive conception of what constituted cor
rective JUStice and injustice.
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this injustice is to restore to each party the balance between loss
and gain that was theirs before the transaction. 3 8
Aristotle's two-fold characterization of justice has been enor
mously influential. Students of justice , since Aristotle, treat ques
tions involving the allocation of social goods, such as wealth, ad
vantage, and opportunity as issues of distributive justice,3 9 and
questions involving the p ropriety of gain as issues of corrective
justice . 40 It can sometimes be forgotten that Aristotle himself ac
knowledged that he was working within a larger framework of
justice as Right Order. 4 1 When considered in that context, Aris
totle's categorizations can be seen as enabling us to more precisely
apply the general concept of justice as Right Order to the evalua
tion of the justice of particular distributive or corrective situa
tions .
The ensuing history of Western reflection o n the p roblem of
justice involves competing substantive answers to the b asic ques
tion of what constitutes the Right Order, either generally or with
respect to a particular area of social concern. A comp rehensive
survey of the dominant substantive theories of justice in the West,
let alone the world, is beyond the scope of this A rticle, despite its
undeniable relevance to any definitive account of the nature of
justice in internatio nal economic law . 42 However, in o rder to
carry out at least the suggestive tasks of the present work, some

33 See id. This applies even in the case of physical injury, where Aristotle
acknowledges that it strains the metaphor to speak of the aggressor as gaining
from the injury to the victim. See id.
39 See, e.g., KOLM, supra note 15, at 4 ("[TJustice is a central question of all
life in society.... [I]t is oy nature 'social' and 'distributive."') (emphasis added).
40 See, e.g. , ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)
(elaborating an Aristotelian model of the corrective nature of private law).
41 See sura text accompanying note 29. This aspect of Aristotle's analysis
is often misunderstood or criticized. See CAMPBELL, supra note 2 1 , at 5 ("[I]t is
best to follow Aristotle ... where, having distinguished between justice as the
'complete virtue' and justice as 'a part of virtue', he goes on to concentrate on
the latter."); H.L .A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 157-5 8 (1961) (writing en
tirely of justice in the specific, Aristotelian sense and criticizing more general
uses of the term).
42 Such a survey is part of a larger project on the general question of justice
in international economic law, from which this Article is drawn. The inter
ested reader is directed to consult any of the several excellent surveys available.
See generally BRIAN BARRY , THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973) ;
CAMPBELL, supra note 2 1 ; ]AMES P. STERBA, HOW TO MAKE PEOPLE JUST
(1988); WHAT IS JUSTICE? (Robert C. Soloman & Mark C. Murphy eels., 1990).
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general observations concerning Western theories of justice are in
order.
To begin with, particular theories of justice, be they liberal or
Marxist, individualistic or communitarian, contractarian o r utili
ta rian, share several traits in common. 43 First, each theory must
explicitly or implicitly account for the possibility of. moral
knowledge. 44 Second, each theory p resents a certain account of
the organization of social relations in terms of whatever moral
p rinciples are identified as most relevant. Third, and perhaps
most important for the purposes of this Article, each theory must
present an account of the sort of rationale one must have for any
version of the organization of social relations . Restated in terms
of the acceptability of outcomes, different philosophical theories
of justice provide particular standards of justification or accept
ability, by which outcomes can be evaluated and accepted or criti
cized.
Since the Enlightenment, if not the Protestant Reformation,45
the dominant philosophical approach to matters of government
and society in the West has been liberalism. Liberalism is a noto
riously difficult term to define. For the purposes of this Article, I
shall adopt the approach suggested by Jeremy Waldron and focus
on liberalism as a theory of justice, a "view about the justification
of social arrangements." 46 In Waldron's reconstruction of liberal
ism, the liberal commitment to freedom and to respect for indi
vidual human will and capacities generates a requirement that "all

43 Alasdair Macintyre cautions that it is misleading to compare different
philosophers' substantive views, or conceptions, of justice, on the grounds that
these conceptions are heavily dependent on their context, namely an underly
ing theory of political rationality and a socio-historic tradition. See ALASDA!R
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 1-11, 389-92 (1988).
However, I believe the discussion which follows evades this objection, m that
the common traits identified are the sort of formal qualities of theories of jus
tice which Macintyre himself investigates and reports.
44 Underlying the search for a persuasive conception of justice is a debate in
moral epistemology. Moral p hilosophers have been p reoccup ied, throughout
the last two centuries, with the possibility of moral knowledge. See Bernard
Cullen, Philosophical Theories of justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 17. In other words, a precondition for a per
suasive theory of j ustice is the articulation of rationally convincing grounds for
our knowledge ot moral categories such as justice.
45 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv (1993).
46 Waldron, supra note 15, at 128; see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1 (1982) ('"[L]iberalism' is above all a theory about
justice ... . )
"

.
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asoects of the social should either be made acceptable or be capa
bl � of being made acceptable to every last individual ."47 In other
words, it is a fundamental requirement of liberal theories of jus
tice that the acceptability of outcomes be demonstrable to any and
all affected individuals.
On this view, the differences among liberal theories of justice
are disagreements over particular principles which claim the abil
ity to meet this stringent test . Thus, for example, utilitarian, 48
egalitarian49 and libertarian 5° theories of justice, while they each
may differ in the types of justification they suggest for outcomes, 5 1
47

See Waldron, supra note 15, at 128.
The utilitarian account of justice is generally traced to the writings of
Mill and Bentham, see JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIA NISM (1863) and
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON
TO MILL (Edwm A. Burtt ed., 1967), and until the publication of John Rawls'A
THEORY OF JUSTICE, was considered dominant in the field. See RAWLS, supra
note 20, at 22-27. See generally UTILITY AND RIGHTS (R.G. Frey ed., 1984).
Initially, utilitarianism conceived of the moral rightness of an act in terms of its
capacity to produce happiness for the members of society. See MILL, supra, at
900. "Happiness" has since been generalized into the concept of "welfare" or
"utility," variously conceived of as hedonic satisfaction, desirable mental states,
simple preference satisfaction, or rational preference satisfaction. See generally
KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 12-18.
49 Liberal egalitarianism, of which John Rawls' theory is the foremost ex
amp le, considers justice to be a matter of the equitable distribution of basic so
cial goods such as rights, resources, and ol?portunities according to some con
cept of "fair shares" that limits an otherwise unlimited utilitarian calculation.
See, e.g. , RAWLS, supra note 45, at 7-11; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?, 10
PHIL & PUB. AFF. 185-246, 283-345 (1981). See generallyKYMLICKA, supra note
20, at 50-55.
50 Libertarians assert the fundamental primacy of individual rights, in par
ticular rights to p roperty-broadly conceived, and therefore see justice in terms
of respect for these rights. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA (1974). See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 95-98.
51 Utilitarianism would justify outcomes in terms of the degree to which
they maximize utilit[, regardless of whose utility. In terms of the p reference
satisfaction model o utilny, a just outcome is one which satisfies the greatest
number of informed p references, even if that means that the preferences of
some will go unsatisfied, and even if, more disturbin gly, the inclusion of
"illegitimate" preferences, or preferences for outcomes such as racial discrimina
tion, which we might question on other moral grounds, means a denial to un
popular groups of what we would want to consider basic rights. See .MlLL, su
pra note 48, at 947 ("UJustice is [merely] a name for certain moral requirements
which, [although hi�h on] the scale of social utility, [may be 'overruled' in the
utilitarian calculus]."). See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 18-30.
Egalitarian theories would justify outcomes with reference to the particular
principle of distribution espoused by the theory. Thus, in a Rawlsian model,
48
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are all liberal theories in that they claim to be able to justify out
comes to any and all affected individuals. 52 What is key in liberal
theories of justice is the centrality of individual liberty and indi
vidual rights to the purpose and role of government and to the es
tablishment of the social order generally. In other words, a pre
condition to j ustice is that the social order reflect and promote
individual liberty and individual rights. 53 The extent to which
each theory differs suggests the conflicts and contradictions
within liberalism; which may also surface as liberal theories of
justice are applied to international economic law.

an outcome will be just if it is in accord with the dictates of the "difference
principle," namely that "[a]ll social primary goods . . . are to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the ad
vantao-e of the least favored." RAWLS, supra note 45, at 303. Libertarianism
would justify outcomes in terms of their degree of respect for fundamental
property rights, thus objecting to any utilitarian calculus or egalitarian redistri
butiOn as unjust insofar as these treat rights as contingent or subject to state re
allocation. For Nozick, social justice in the Rawlsian model is imp ossible, in
that any redistributive mechanism contradicts the basic tenet of a free society
and a free market, namely the primacy of individual choice and individual
rights. See NOZICK, supra note 50, at ix, 155-60; KYMLICKA, supra note 20, 96107.
52 Despite the fact that some preferences will go unsatisfied and the prob
lem of illegitimate preferences, utilitarianism is at least in principle a liberal
theo ry in that, formally speaking, each person's preferences count, and count
equally , in the utility-maximization calculus. See BENTHAM, supra note 48, at
804 (describing evaluation of merits of legislation in terms of aggregate of indi
vidual pain ana pleasure); see afsoKYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 25-30.
Egalitarian theories are clearly liberal in that their basic premise is the
moral equality of individuals; the justification for any distribution scheme in
volves individual rights and the individual economic effects of choices and cir
cumstances and, in Rawls' case, the theory is based on the argument that any
rational individual in the "Original Position" would choose his principle of jus
tice. See RAWLS, supra note 45, at 19-21. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note
20, 58-66.
. �ibe_rtariar;.t�eories are, of course, liberal, even if they orpos_<liberal" �e
dlstnbutlve po11c1es, because they are based on the pnmacy o md1v1dual choiCe
and individual rights. For Nozick, rights precede justice. See NOZICK, supra
note 50, at ix ("Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group
may do to them.").
53 In contrast, Marxist theories of justice--that accept the concept of justice
at all--propose a radically different, communal measure of justice, as do com
munitarian theories, which are essentially non-Marxist critiques of liberal ac
counts of justice. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 160-237; STEVEN
LlJr<.ES, MARXISM AND MO RALITY (1985) ; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE ( 1982) . In these app roaches, outcomes are just if
they can be made acceptable to certain group s, despite the fact that they may
not be justifiable to certain affected indiv1duals.
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Right Order and Social A llocation in International
Economic Law

The centrality of j ustice to the analysis and construction of in
ternational economic law is evident in the nature of the concept
of justice itself. In the Platonic concept of justice as Right Order,
whenever we consider the proper order of any aspect of social re
lations, we are considering a question of justice . In the Aristote
lian elaboration of this concept, when law and public institutions
affect the allocation of social benefits or the correction of im
p ro per �ain, they are raising questions of distributive and correc
.
tive JUStice.
Therefore, it is necessarily true that every time the question of
the proper order of a given aspect of international economic rela
tions arises, one is considering a question of justice. 5 4 Moreover,
where law is a p rimary tool for establishing the social o rder, ques
tions of j ustice in international economic relations will arise as
questions of international economic law. International economic
law does indeed affect fundamental decisions about the allocation
of social benefits among states and among their citizens, i ncludin g
benefits such as economic advanta�es, preferences an d opportuni
7
ties; 55 wealth and pro� erty rights; information; 5 and the protec
tion of the law itself. 8 International economic law also involves
mechanisms for the identification and correction of improper gain
through dispute resolution mechanisms, on the interstate 5 9 and

54 This conclusion depends on the applicability of the concept of j ustice,
first developed as Right Order within a pol!tical community, then as Right Or
der between political communities. See infra note 6 1 .
55 Such benefits include, for example, tariff rates, tariff preferences, rights
of establishment, and provision of services.
56 Among this category of rights are, for example, development assistance,
trade finance, and intellectual property protection.
57 Access to information is affected by transnational issues such as trans
parency requirements and technical assistance.
5 8 Whether, for example, economic sanctions are available to increase the
effectiveness of human rights protections, or whether countries can protect en
vironmental resources througfi embargo statutes.
59 For example, dispute settlement mechanisms such as NAFTA's chapter
20 and the WTO panel process can be understood as institutions for the appli
cation of corrective justice. See, e. g., Trade Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997,
at A22 (criticizing WTO panel's failure to censure alle g edly protectionist prac
tices in the Japanese film industry as an example of "trade injustice") .
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p rivate60 levels . Such influence on the part of international eco
nomic law must therefore be evaluated in terms of theories of dis
tributive and corrective justice. 6 1

60

The case law of the European Court of Justice and NAFT A's investor
a�bit_ration prov�sions are examples of the international application of correc
tive j ustice to pnvate party conduct .
1 The fact that one is confronting j ustice issues in relations among states,
and among disparate social systems and peoples, rather than within a sin gle
state or social system, raises tmportant theoretical questions that can only be
touched on in this Article. First, one might assert that obligations to do justice
are, by their very nature, not suited to extension beyond the boundaries
(presumed territorial) of a given political community. See, e.s., RAWLS, supra
note 45, at 12, 272 n.9; RAWLS, supra note 21, at 7-8, 457 (notmg that a theory
of justice presupposes a closed soc1ety that seeks justice within a closed system,
not including justice between nations) . However, this view may be an artifact
of social contractarian arguments for political morality, rather than a general
limitation inherent to moral obligations by their very nature. See Anthony
D'Amato & Kristen Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation of Nuclear
Power Technology, 7 4 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1043-46 (1988) (discussing tensions be
tween universal and socially contingent aspects of social contractarian ap
proaches to political philosophy). It has, in fact, been vigorously asserted that
territorial boundaries are irrelevant to moral obligations. See Fernando R.
Tes6n, The Kantian Theory ofInternational Law, 92 C OLUM L. REV. 53 , 82-83
(1992) ("The contingent divtsion of the world into discrete nation-states does
not transform polittcal freedom from an ethical imperative into a mere his
tory."); D 'Amato & Engel, supra, at 1042 ("[A] national boundary is an artifi
cial, as well as a morally irrelevant, boundary with respect to moral obliga
tions.") . Moreover, Rawls has been criticized for failing to extend the original
position to its logical transnational application. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE,
T HE GNAT IS O LDER THAN MAN 253 -62 (1993) . Finally, to the extent that ob
ligations of justice depend upon some form of shared political community, it
may be that international economic relations, particularly economic integration
systems, establish the requisite form or level of transnational community. See
D'Amato & Engel, supra at 1046-47 ("The requirements of j ustice apply to in
stitutions and practices . . . in which social activity produces relative or absolute
benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not take
place. ") (quoting CHARLES R. BEITZ, P OLITICA L THEORY A ND INTER
NA TIONAL RELATIONS 13 1 (197 9)) ; supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
It can also be argued that, in the international community, as it exists to\ day, obligations ofd·ustice are tempered or superseded by some form of realpoli
tik, see Terry Nar in, Realism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Rule of Law, 81 AM .
Soc'Y INT' L L. 415-16 ( 1987) (ar_guing that realism dictates that foreign policy
be guided by prudent strategies for national survival, not morality) , or that ef
forts at promoting justice wtll inevitably be perceived as "cultural imperialism,
paternaltsm or worse." Alfred P. Rubin, A Skeptical View, 47 U. CHI. L . REV.
4 03, 405 (1980) (reviewing CHARL ES R. BEITZ'S POLITICAL T HEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979)) . However, this sort of pragmatic or utili
tarian reasoning can itself be criticized on moral grounds as treating absolute
moral obligations as discretionary.
.
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The importance of recognizing this link between trade and
justice increases with the globalization of the world economy and
the development of international economic law . The greater the
scope and importance of international economic law as a feature
of international economic relationships, and the deeper its impact
throughout the societies of trading states beyond traditional eco
nomic issues such as tariff rates and investment rules, the more we
must be concerned with its normative impact and implications.
In other words, the b roader the law's ordering p ower, and the
more its "order" impinges on our attempts and our ability to
"order" other aspects of our society, the more we must be con
cerned with the "Rightness" or the "justice" of the resulting inter
national economic order.
In addition to the conceptual links discussed thus far between
justice, international economic relations, and international eco
nomic law, there are very particular reasons why our j urispru
dence requires us to consider, or at the very least does not excuse
us from considering, what claims a concept of justice might make
on the construction of international economic law . This assertio n
shall be explored in connection with the three p rinciple accounts
of the relationship between j ustice and law, which also apply to
the question of the relationship between justice and international
economic law: the traditional naturalist view, the modern natu
ralist view, and the positivist view. 62
There are many forms of naturalism, from the classical natu
ralism of Greece and Rome 63 through the systematic, magisterial
naturalism of Aquinas 64 and up to the various modern naturalisms
of Fuller, 65 Finnis, 66 and even Dworkin. 67 In its strongest form,
6

2

There are, of course, other accounts of law and its relationship with mo
rality, including legal realism, critical legal studies, and historical junsprudence.
The three accounts discussed in this Article were chosen because of their his
toric importance.
63 See generally J.M. KELLY, A S HORT H ISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL
THEORY 19-2 1 , 57-63 (1992) .
64 See St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, questions 90-95, reprinted in
INTRODU CTION TO ST. T HOMAS AQUINAS 609-50 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 194 8)
[hereinafter AQUINAS].
65 See L ON L . FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) .
66 See J OHN FINNI S, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1988) .
6 7 In his Dunwoody lecture, Dworkin reluctantly accepts the label of
"naturalist" insofar as that means his theory "makes the content of law some
times depend on the correct answer to some moral question." Ronald A.
Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, in 2 NATURAL LAW 1 87 Gohn Finnis ed.,
.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/8

1998]

TRADE A ND JUSTICE

407

of which Aquinas is the foremost medieval exponent6 8 and Finnis
9
the leading modern representative, 6 naturalism asserts two linked
pro � ositions : that knowledge of objective moral truth is p ossi
ble, 0 and that humanly promulgated law must conform to the
dictates or norms of this moral truth in order to be considered
fully valid law.7 1 While Aquinas and Finnis acknowledge the exis
tence of morally questionable laws, 72 both Aquinas and Finnis
would regard such "law" as fatally defective although A quinas,
extent Finnis, might nevertheless acknowledge
and to a greater
1
.
.
73
th etr status as aw tn some sense.
In contrast, both Fuller and D workin conceive of the moral
ity which they see as relevant to law as something less than the
objective morality of traditional naturalism. Fuller's morality is a
limited one, confined to what he terms the morality of law it
self/4 and thus his naturalism could be called a "limited" natural
ism. Dworkin, while seeking to express a link to broader moral
principles, sees that morality as the morality of the relevant

1991) . However, in important respects his stance IS beyond the natural
ist/positivist distinction. See id.
68
See AQUINAS, supra note 64.
69 On Finnis' role as a leading modern exponent of traditional naturalism,
see Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992) (crediting Finnis
with the powerful contemporary restatement of the classical traditwn) . Re
garding Finnis' own views, see FINNIS, supra note 66.
70 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 9 1 , art. 2 (noting that natural
law is rational human nature's participatiOn, through reason, in eternal truths);
see also FINNIS, supra note 66, at 59-99 (arguing that the seven basic values of ex
istence can be identified as self-evident through rational introspection) .
71 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 9 1 , art. 3 (noting that human
laws proceed from practical reasoning upon the precepts of natural law) ; id. at
questwn 95, art. 2 ("[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law as
it is derived from the law of nature."); see also Hans Kelsen, Foundation of the
Natural Law Doctrine, 1973 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 2, 83-1 1 1 reprinted in 1
NATIJRAL LAW 125 (John Finnis ed. , 199 1) .
72 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 93, art. 3 (recognizing existence
of unjust or wicked laws) ; see also FINNIS, supra note 66.
73 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 93, art. 3 (noting that even an
unjust law retains some apJ?earance of law through its promulgation by one in
authority, though its principal character is of violence, not law);FINNlS, supra
note 66, at 363-66 (arguing that to say unjust laws are not laws distorts a com
plex relationship, as unjust law may still be law in a technical sense but not
worthy of obedience as law) .
7 4 See FULLER, supra note 65, at 38-44 (reviewing the basic elements of law's
morality) .
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community, not a particular moral order based in God's will or
an obj ective natural order. 75 This results in a sort of "open" natu
ralism, where what is necessary is a link to moral p rinciples, and
not the possibility of an objectively identifiable universal moral
.
76
VieW .
With respect to either form of naturalism, the demands of j us
tice will be expressed as fundamental claims upon international
economic law and its actors, insofar as internatio nal economic law
claims to be law, and its actors attempt to operate within that law.
The heart of the naturalist view of international economic l aw
can be expressed syllogistically as follows :
(1) international economic law consists of the regulation of in
ternational economic activity through law;
(2) all law, insofar as it claims the status of law, must be j ust;
(3) therefore, international economic law, insofar as it claims
to be law, must be just .
The differences among the various naturalisms lies in their dif
ferent versions of the minor premise, according t o their definition
of justice as it is relevant to law, and their account of the relationh
s lp . 77
The distinctiveness of the modern positivist view lies in its
substitution of an essentially formal description of the defining
characteristic of law for what had heretofore been an essentially
.

.

75

.
See D wor 1nn,

supra note 67.
"In principle, natural law theory may adopt any ethics." Deryck Bey
leveld & Roger Brownsword, The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law The
ory and Legal Positivism, in 2 NATURAL LAW, supra note 67, at 138.
7 7 The traditional naturalist view would go beyond the bare assertion of
the minor premise and assert a particular substantive standard of justice for in
ternational economic law, derived from a philosophical or theological account
of objective morality. Modern naturalism would assert, in the limited natural
ist version, that international economic law, as is required of all law, must con
form t o the basic morality of law in order to have such status. However, these
claims are more limited than the moral claims which traditional naturalism
might impose on international economic law. The open naturalist view would
assert that international economic law, at least in the context of dispute resolu
tion, must have recourse to some theory of justice, but would not specify or de
fend any particular theory, asserting rather the link itself. Thus, one could say
that the McDougal/Lasswell approach to international law is a form of natural
ism in that it does not attempt to argue for the key values of a universal order
of human dignity as part of its theory of law, but does maintain that a link be
tween law and these values, however established; accordingly it plays an essen
tial role in the appraisal and critique of public order systems. See MYRES S.
MCD O UGAL & ASSOC . , STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 16, 21-22 (1960).
76
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normative one.7 8 In The Concept of Law, for example, H. L . A .
Hart provides a sophisticated account of law as a system of pri
mary and secondary rules. 7 9 The conflict between this view of
law and naturalism lies not in any positivist account of the formal
qualities of legal systems, but in the separability thesis: the asser
tion that such a view is a sufficient account of the nature and
fun ction of law, separate from any reference to the law's moral.
tty. 80
Using Hart's theory as an example, the positivist view of in
ternational economic law can also be expressed syllogistically, il
lustrating the contrast to natural law as well:
(1) international economic law consists of the regulation of in
ternational economic activity through law;
(2) all law, insofar as it claims the status of law, must consist of
a system of primary and secondary rules;
(3) therefore, international economic law, insofar as it claims
to be law, must consist of a system of primary and secondary
rules.
Any mention of justice is absent from the minor premise, and
therefore necessarily absent from the conclusion.
What is particularly noteworthy for our purposes is that, in
spite of his insistence on the formal independence of law and mo
rality as a definitional and constitutive matter, Hart took great
pains to point out that law in fact could not and should not be
evaluated independently from morality. To begin with, Hart ac
knowledges a fundamental similarity between a narrowly defined
version of justice as fairness and certain essential properties of law

78

Law, in this view, is to be seen as "merely" or "essentially" certain types
of statements, declarations, or rules that qualify as law because of their formal
characteristics and not by reference to moral principles. Hart, for example,
characterizes law's "essence" as the union of pnmary and secondary rules, and
contrasts this to traditional naturalist accounts of this essence as consisting of
the necessary link between law and morality. See HART, supra note 41, a t 15155.
79 The "primary" rules of law governing behavior recognizable in primitive
and modern legal systems are themselves established, administered, and changed
through the application of "secondary" rules which characterize mature legal
systems, chief among these being the rule of recognition. See id.
80 See id. at 1 85-87; see, e.g. , David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Le al Theo y, in
r
z..
RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 49 (Marshall Co
hen ed. , 1984) .
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as a rule system. 8 1 Moreover, of all the claims of morality, the
claims of justice are privileged in their criticism of law, because
justice, in the sense of treating like cases alike, is very much like
the notion of proceeding by a rule . 82 However, i n neither case
does Hart admit the claim that legal systems and laws, in o rder to
be so considered, must comply with the broader claims of natural
law, or with the claims of justice more broadly defined, which are
very distinct from the nature of law . 8 3 Law's morality, broadly
speaking, is not rooted in law itself, but in the moral obli gations
we are subj ect to in private and public life on the basis of inde
pendent philosophical or theological commitments. Nevertheless,
Hart does contemplate and indeed advocate the moral critique of
substantive law. In fact, he considers the positivist definition of
law to facilitate an accurate moral critique of law . 8 4
From a positivist standpoint, therefore, the demands of j ustice
on international economic law will take the form of p olicies to be
pursued through such law, either as a matter of independent
moral obligation or simple prudence. The p ositivist argument
p resupposes no necessary link between international economic
law and j ustice, or any other value, at a definitional level, beyond
a shared concern for the application of rules. To the extent inter
national economic law is created or evaluated with refe rence to
the substantive claims of justice, this may reflect simply the deci
sion of the law-makers or analysts that it is prudent or useful for
international economic law to be just. Alternatively, a p o sitivist
might conclude that international economic law must be j ust, but
81

In Hart's account of the relationship of justice to law, he admits a close
link between the administration of law and Aristotelian notions of equality in
distribution and correction. See HART, supra note 4 1 , at 1 60-62.
8 2 See id. at 1 6 1 .
8 3 Hart thus explicitly relies on a narrow Aristotelian concel t o f specific
justice, distinguishing it from broader moral claims. This is vita for h1m be
cause, as we have seen, he admits a special link between this sort of justice and
law. See discussion supra Section 2 . 1 . If he accepted the broader view of justice,
it would both resemb1e less the administrative requirements of rule systems and
in fact admit the entire naturalist argument.
8 4 Hart contends that the naturalist assertion, that unjust laws are not laws,
is muddled and merely confuses the issues at stake. He suggests, instead, that
the conflict is precisely over obedience to a valid law that may nevertheless be
"'too iniquitous to obey or apply.'" See HART , supra note 4 1 , at 205.
As Hart explains, a p ositivist analysis of law squarely/ resents us with the
choice among greater and lesser evils and injustices involve when, for example,
later courts are called upon to judge liability or guilt under Nazi statutes. See id.
at 208- 12.
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for reasons of obligations rooted in political o r moral philosophy,
rather than its nature as law . 8 5 However, in neither case is there
any sense in which positivism is an obstacle to or substitute for
the normative evaluation of international economic law, nor does
it diminish the importance of theories of justice to such an evalua
86
tion on independent moral or prudential grounds.
2.3.

Inte--rnational Economic Law and the Claims ofjustice

One 's view of the nature and force of the actual claims of jus
tice on international economic law will differ according to one's
position on the relation of law to morali
generally, and accord
ing to one's substantive theory of j ustice. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to address all substantive theories of justice and the
richness of their possible claims on international economic law,
nor will this Article fully develop o ne substantive position on jus
tice and apply to it to the richness of issues in international eco
nomic law. Rather, what this Article will attempt in what fol
lows is to suggest, in an illustrative manner, how theories of
justice could entail particular claims on international economic
law. In the section which follows, this type of general relation
ship will be explored in connection with the trade linkage issue.
First, and most importantly from a Western standpoint , the
claims of justice will affect the threshold question of the rule of
law in international economic relations, and on this there is wide
agreement. Fundamental to any conception of Western justice is
88
Such a commitment is also
a commitment to the rule of law.
recognized by traditional trade theorists as a cornerstone of our
attempts to regulate international economic relations through in-

lJ

8

5 Of course, a positivist's particular view of the requirements of justice in
international economic law will depend on the substantlVe theory of JUStice to
which that positivist is committed.
8
6 In fact, one can extrapolate from Hart's writings that positivism facili
tates the normative evaluation of international economic law, and might, in
some limited way, even require it.
8 7 There is, however, no view of international economic law that does not
presuppose or entail some answer to the question of what constitutes the Right
Order, with the possible exception of a chaotic one. Even an anarchic view of
international law embodies one view of the Right Order.
88
See Aristotle, Politics, in ARl STO TLE, supra note 29, at 59 8 ("[L]aws,
when good, should be sup reme.") ; CAMPBELL, supra note 21, at 23-27 (noting
that the rule of law ideal 1s linked both to substantive justice-consistent apph
cation of just rules-and formal justice-consistency of rule application as an
independent principle of justice) .
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ternational economic law. 8 9 This commitment to the rule of law
as a p rinciple of western justice necessarily implies that interna
tional economic law systems, in particular their institutional
mechanisms, are subject to evaluation and critique according to
how effectively they uphold, advance, or undercut the rule of law
0
in international economic relations. 9
Western theories of justice can also serve to justify, from a
normative standpoint, the fundamental economic concept of lib
eralization of trade. The core trade and integratio n commitment
to liberalize trade naturally reflects the principles of trade eco
nomics, in which liberalized trade contributes to increased wel
fare due to gains in efficiency and the unfettered operation of
comparative advantage. In doing so, however, liberalized trade
also contributes directly to the achievement of the core aim of
liberal justice, in that such welfare increases are a necessary p re
condition to a more just distribution of wealth and an improved
standard of living for the least advantaged. 9 1 Trade liberalization
also directly reflects the fundamental commitment to individual
liberty common to all Western theories of justice, in that it di-

89 JOHN H . JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 85-88 (1989)
(arguing that a rule-oriented approach should predominate in international eco
nomic relations) . But see Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule
ofLa w , 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1 030 (1984-85) (suggesting that GATT's major
advantage lay in its ambiguous, flexible, and non-legal approach) .
In fact, the modern international economic law movement has been at the
forefront of the expansion of the rule of law in international relations generally.
See Tohn H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Reflections on the
"Boiferroom " ofInternational Relations, 1 0 AM. U. . lNT'L L. & PoL'Y 595, 596
("[I]t is plausible to suggest that ninety percent o international law work is in
reality international economic law in some form or anmher.") ; Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 398, 399 (1996-97) ("[International economic law] has become one of
the most important foreign policy instruments for promoting not only eco
nomic welfare but also individual freedom and rule of law.") .
90 See generally Petersmann, supra note 89, at 428-29, 43 1 , 4 5 1 (evaluating
rule of law aspects of select international economic law institutions) .
9 1 See Petersmann, supra note 89, at 400 (noting that "market institutions"
regulated by economic law "are an indispensable complement of human rights
for [the promotion of] human well-being") . See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 8, 203-22 (1997) (noting that markets play
an important, albeit limited role in a basic rights system, for example in the de
velopment of constitutional democracies in Eastern Europe) . This assumes, of
course, that the distributive justice issues are also address ed . See infra notes 1 05,
109, 128, 146.
"

;
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reedy expands the scope for unfettered individual decision
making in economic activity. 9 2
Justice also plays a central role in the evaluation of interna
tional economic law institutions. Institutions created through in
ternational economic agreements, such as the World Trade Or
ganization ("WTO") and the NAFTA Commission, can be
analyzed from a variety of perspectives independent of moral and
political philosophy. However, a j ustice perspective can clarify
the implications of the design and operation of such institutions
for the realization of our fundamental values, affecting for exam
ple how trade institutions reach decisions and resolve disputes. 9 3
3 . JUSTICE AND THE " TRA DE AND" PHENOMENON

So far, the assertion that the claims of justice are essential to
the analysis of international economic law is not likely to excite
much controversy, even among those who maintain what one
scholar has termed the "Efficiency Model" of trade law in which
trade is strictly a matter of economic efficiency and welfare . 9 4
That is, in part, because the issues discussed thus far, such as the
rule of law, elimination of trade barriers, and the construction
and operation of trade institutions, can be seen from the vantage
point of traditional economic theory as simply part of what trade
.
1s " ab out. " 9 5

92 See Peters mann, supra note 89, at 400 (noting that properly functioning
market institutions (i.e., markets regulated by economic law) are an indispensa
ble complement of human rights for promotmg individual autonomy) . O n this
view government intervention in trade through tariffs and non-tantf barriers,
for example, is inadvisable insofar as it reduces mdividual economic liberty.
93 For example, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann's work applying constitutional
ism theory to the WTO and other international economic law institutions
eoints out several aspects of trade liberalization systems which advance or re
flect fundamental liberal commitments to justice in social and economic rela
tions, including: separation of powers, protection of fundamental rights, neces
sity and proportionality rules, and democratic participation. See id. at 429-32 .
9 4 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, in Symposium,
Linkage as Phenomenon: A n Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 201 ( 1998) ; infra notes 130-3 1 and accompanying text.
95 Of course, there may be some controversy about the precise outcomes
that different normative theories may dictate. For example, to the extent con
stitutionalism theory suggests that bmding dispute resolution is to be preferred
on normative grounds over simr:le advisory opinions, this claim might be re
sisted by those who see the decis10n as a purely functional or political one. See
supra notes 89-90.
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However, the implications of justice for international eco
nomic law become more controversial when one moves beyond
these sorts of issues to a consideration of other trade policy issues
raised by the current "trade and" debate. This debate forces us to
consider questions involving gross economic inequalities , conflict
ing concepts of human dignity and environmental p rotection,
other heavily value-laden issues such as "culture" and :'p roperty,"
and the role of such questions in trade law at all . In discussing
linkages such as "trade and development," "trade and labor,"
"trade and the environment , " and "trade and human rights, " we
are delving more deeply and perhaps more problematically into
the nature of the relationship between trade and justice.
3.1.

Recognizing the Linkage Between Justice and the "Trade
, Debate
and

__

Each "trade and
" debate has, at its root, a question or se
ries of questions which are about justice. Perhaps the m ost fun
damental question is this: Who shall we trade with, and on what
terms? More particularly, we may ask the following: What are
the moral implications for us if our trading p artners are, as a
whole, much poorer than ourselves? 9 6 What if our trading part
ner's society is h hly stratified, such that the gains from trade
only go to a few? 9 What if a trading p artner has a different or no
concwtion of environmental harm and environmental protec
tion? What if our trading partners have a radically different (or
lack any) concept of human dignity? 99 Can we use the trading
system to redistribute global wealth across states, encourage more
equitable distributions of wealth within states, change o r enforce
human dignity laws, or p rotect the environment in such cases,
even at some cost to liberal trading principles? Should we?
It is the main contention of this A rticle that these questions,
and the similar questions underlying each of the maj or "trade
and" debates, are inescapably moral questions, i . e . , they are ques
tions of justice. They are justice questions because they are ques
tions of order, and they are inquiries into the Right Order for the

.ip

96
97
98
99

See infra notes 1 00-08 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 109-14 ;1nd accompanying text.
See infra notes 1 15-24 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
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g1ven set of social relationships they presuppose or establish . 100
They are questions of justice because their resolution depends
upon our making decisions as to the allocation of social goods and
social burdens , and may involve an investigation into the propri
ety of certain gains and the correction of improper gain. 1 0 1
The link between trade and the inequalities of various kinds
that exist between trading states is a fitting place to begin explor
ing this contention, as the link is an ancient and perhaps constitu
tive one. On the one hand, the theory of comparative advantage
suggests that certain inequalities are the sine qua non of trade, in
that it is the disparity in resource distribution which offers trad
ing states the key opportunity to specialize. 102 However, the
more troublesome aspect of the link between trade and inequali
ties in levels of development among states has also been recog
nized since the early days of the study of trade itself, consisting of
the manifold opportunities for outright predation and con
quest, 1 03 as well as for the pursuit of other inherently self-serving
policies such as mercantilism, 1 04 presented to developed states in
their trade relations with the less-developed world .
100

That they involve relationships across societies and national boundaries,
it is argued, need not alter the basis of moral obligation. See supra note 61.
101
For example, Dunoff writes that trade and issues such as intellectual
property highlight the fact that interstate, distributional questions are at the
center of international trade policy, challengin & one view common in the litera
ture that cooperation or collaboration, rather tnan distribution, is the key issue.
See Dunoff, supra note 94.
102
See, e. g. , PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 668 (1973) (noting that the
starting point for comparative advantage is diversity in conditions of produc
tion between different countries) .
103
In his seminal work, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Adam Smith writes:
Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided
over and directed the first project of establishing [the American] colo
nies; the folly of hunting after gold and silver mines, and the injustice
of coveting the possession of a country whose harmless natives, far
from having ever injured the people of Europe, had received the first
adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospitality . . . . [I]t was
not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and inj ustice ofthe Euro
pean governments which peopled and cultivated America.
ADAJ\1 SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 35 0-51 (Kathryn Sutherland ed. , 1993) .
104
See id. at 35 1-52.
When [the North and South American colonies] were effectuated, and
had become so considerable as to attract the attention of the mother
country, the first regulations which she made with regard to them had
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The problem of trade and inequality is a paradigmatic case of
the link between trade and justice . The distribution of social
goods between the richer and the poorer is a central concern of
theories of justice. 1 05 Public debate concerning the relations be
tween richer and poorer states as a matter of justice p eaked within
international economic law with the birth and demise of the
movement
for
a New
International
Economic
Order
1 06
While the NIEO may have failed as a political mat
("NIE0") .
ter, this does not mean that the arguments asserted by NIEO ad
vocates have been refuted.
One can discern in the debate over trade and development a
range of positions traceable to the principal Western substantive
theories of justice . Perhaps the most familiar reply to the ques
tion "What is our duty to developing states in structuring our
trade relationships?" might consist of utilitarian justifications for
various types of assistance to underdeveloped states, such as an
appeal to increased stability in international relations or to the
creation of larger and stronger markets of consumers for our
10
p roducts. 7 An egalitarian liberal approach, h owever, might re
ject such utilitarian reasoning despite an apparent agreement in
outcomes, and argue instead for the existence of a moral duty to
aid poorer states based on deontological moral principles. Rawls'
difference principle, for example, could be extended to cover eco-

!d.

always in view to secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce;
to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expense, and,
consequently, rather to damp and discourage, than to quicken and
forward the course of their prosperity.
105

This is certainly true as applied to domestic society, and, it is argued,
would hold equally true where the richer and the poorer are states and not just
individuals. See supra note 6 1 .
106
The New International Economic Order, or NIEO , was a movement
among developing countries within the United Nations ("UN") to force a shift
in international economic relations away from structurally disadvantageous
policies towards a more equitable relationship between developed and develop
mg countries. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Eco
nomic Order, G.A. Res. 320 1 , U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess. , Supp. No. 1 , at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715. Despite the adoption of the
founding resolution and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
G.A. Res. 328 1 , U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1 , at 50, U.N. Doc. A/963 1 (1975) ,
the movement has been widely acknowledged as a failure. See generally Bartram
S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL U.
L. REV. 347 (1994); Robert E. Hudec, GA TT and the Developing Countries, 1992
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 67.
107
See SMITH, supra note 103, at 308-09.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/8

TRADE A ND JUSTICE

1998]

417

nomic relations with less advantaged states, leading t o a duty to
effect wealth redistributions across national boundaries beyond
1 8
those that are justifiable on utilitarian lines. 0 A libertarian view,
in contrast, would question such p rinciples and resist any such
trans-boundary redistribution in favor of some minimal notion of
procedural fairne�� or fai rness of opportunity on the part of less
advantaged states. 9
Whatever one's view as to the appropriate answer to these
questions, simply understanding the trade-development link as a
justice issue involving the problem of inequality implies that we
are not free to govern our economic relationships with poorer na
tions solely with regard to the politics of the moment. Moreover,
viewing the trade and development linkage as a justice matter
raises the question of how one can consistently be a redistributive
1 10
egalitarian at home and a libertarian or political realist abroad.
Given the nature of our concept of justice, it becomes incumbent
on those seeking to establish an economic order that does not
consider the claims of less developed states to articulate a norma
tive basis for this position. In other words, they must explain
why such an order would be Right.
A related, and far more controversial, inequality problem in
volves the inequalities within the societies of tradin g states and
whether, as a matter of distributive justice, trading states are obli
gated to take into account such inequalities in their trade and eco-

108

255-60.

See D'Amato

&

Engel, supra note 6 1 , at 1047; STONE, supra note 6 1 , at

109

The classic libertarian-egalitarian conflict involves a fundamental disa
greement over the moral legitimacy of state-effected wealth redistribution. In
this context, the debate would be over the legitimacy of such redistributions
effected through trade agreements between states. However, even if one con
cedes to the hbertarian the assertion that the free market may be the best
mechanism for basic distribution questions, the criticism can be made that the
moral basis for this position is suostantially undermined by the reality of ine
quality, particularly gross inequality, in natural "endowments." What is there
to guarantee that the open market exchanges do not further erode or deny the
bas1c rights of the weaker party? The liberal objection, that there can be no
freedom where two sides are grossly unequal, emerged in the early nineteenth
century in the work of T.H. Green and others. See KELLY, supra note 63, at
306. Therefore, the state has a role in setting the basic conditions for a mean
ingful exchange, a moral exchange. !d.
1 10
I am not so much questioning the validity of a libertarian view, but the
consistency of simultaneously holding both commitments.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

418

U.

[Vol 19:2

Pa. J lnt 'L Econ. L.

nomic integration systems . 1 1 1 At a normative level , the assertio n
that distributive inequalities within a society are j ustice matters
can scarcely be gainsaid. But do states have a duty to consider
inequality problems within their trading partners? Moreover, at
an empirical level, one can distinguish between the distributive
inequalities which might exist in a state relatively independent of
trade and its effects, and the well-recognized fact that the effects of
trade itself can vary widely with regard to groups within trading
states; some group s may suffer great harm while the state as a
whole prospers. 1 1
Even if one were unwilling to recognize a
duty to consider domestic inequalities generally, might not this
empirical distinction between "types" or "sources" of inequality
suggest a duty to consider trade-related inequalities?
From a utilitarian viewpoint, one might consider such con
cern useful or desirable but decide that the significant p ractical
difficulties in responding to these trans-boundary concerns, and
the potential friction from claims of meddling in internal affairs,
would render the cost of such policies too high i n relation to the
benefit potentially to be achieved. A liberal Kantian analysis of
international law, however, would suggest that recognition of
such concerns and the e �su n � respo �sibil }y are unavoidab le as a
.
.
matter of respect for md1v1dual nghts.
A commumtanan
analysis would agree with the need to consider the effects of trade
on the disadvantaged in a trading partner's society, but would
suggest that the relevant unit of analysis is the group rather than

�

}

·

111

Traditionally, the economic disadvantages of individuals within their
own states were not considered a legitimate subject for international law, which
favored the black box or billiard ball approach to state relations. Recently,
however, this view of international law has undergone significant criticism and
modification from the human rights movement and particularly from feminist
theorists of international law, who have attacked the public/pnvate distinction
as inimical to the rights of women within state societies. See Hilary Charles
worth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 6 13 ,
625-30 (1991).
1 12
See JACKSON, supra note 89, at 1 6; see also Philip Alston, International
Trade as an Instrument of Positive Human R ights Policy 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 155,
177 (1982) (noting that the ILO advocates trade liberalization that addresses
possible adverse labor and distribution effects) ; Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hi
erarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin A merica: Towards a Com munal Model of
Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221 , 275 (1994) (noting
that economic neoliberalism has not addressed, and may have worsened, the
condition of vulnerable groups) .
1 13
See Tes6n, supra note 61 , at 8 1-84 (arguing that human rights protec
tions are fundamental to international law and the legitimacy of states) .
..
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the individual, and that trading states have an affirmative duty to
1
act to improve the plight of vulnerable groups. 14 In contrast, a
libertarian might limit a state's duty, both at home and abroad, to
attempts to encourage policies in our trading partners that favor
individual rights and the p rotection of private property. 1 15 In any
event, the simple assertion that , whatever one's duty is to one ' s
less fortunate fellows, that duty does not apply across national
boundaries, is not likely to go unchallenged in contemporary de
bates over the justice of failing to consider the stratification of
one ' s tra d.mg partners. 1 1 6
The trade and environment linkage by contrast, has been at
i
the forefront of the linkage movement . 1 7 Environmentalists are
114

See Carrasco, supra note 1 1 2, at 305 (arguing that economic regulation
must ?ive priority to conditions affecting vulnerable groups) .
11
Alternatively, a libertarian might maintain that states have no role at all
with respect to the domestic policies of other states, stemming from a view of
states as "libertarian individuals" facing regulatory intervention both horizon
tally from one another and vertically from International regimes.
1 16
From the perspective of one's moral obligation, why should our con
cern for those with an inequitable share of resources be affected by the inter
vening modality of a state? Sovereignty is the traditional answer, but it may
not be an adequate one. Perhaps it 1s legitimate to assert that sovereignty pre
vents us from forcing our notion of eqmtable distributions on another tradin g
p artner. But might it not be the case that sovereignty is more likely to be raised
by us, ourselves, to avoid the assertion that we have a duty, rather than bv the
intended beneficiaries of our concern? With resl?ect to the collapse o t the
Mexican economy and the devaluation of the peso m 1994, Jorge Castaneda as
serts the complicny of the United States in its decision to ignore the undemo
cratic politics and unequal wealth distribution accompanymg Mexico's trade
liberalization reforms. "[N]o one, it seems, was willing to analyze the over
whelming evidence of abuses and financial mismanagement in Mexico since
1988 . . . . Those surprised by the economic collapse and the stench of it all had
simply neglected to open their eyes." JORGE G. CASTANEDA, THE MEXICAN
SHOCK: ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (1995) .
1 17
The trade and environment linkage has been actively in the public eye
since the early 1 990s. Thomas J. Schoenbaum notes that, while the GATT es
tablished a Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade in 1 971,
it did not meet until 199 1 . See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 9 1 AM.
J. INT'L L. 268 , 268 (1997) . The early 1990's also saw the publication of path
oreaking works such as Daniel Esty's Greening the GA TT: Trade, Environment
and the Future; see generally EsTY, supra note 2, and a series of GATT panel re
Ports destined to have a significant impact on the trade and environment de
b ate. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Im
ports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS20/R (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839; GATT
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S . Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Aug. 16, 1991 GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) , reprinted in 30 I.L . M.
1 594 (the Tuna/Dolphin decisions) .
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attracted to the possibility of putting the tremendous leverage af
forded by the threat of trade sanctions in the service of ensuring
1 18
and
compliance with environmental protection obligations,
have concerns about the trade regulatorl system adversely affect
11
In much the same way,
ing their regulatory goals and systems .
the trade community fears the environmentalists' interference
.
1
w1"11 un dermme t h e tra d"mg system. 2 0
It is not necessarily clear, at first blush, how the trade and en
vironment linkage reflects a debate over justice. Even if one were
1 1
to concede an ethical obligation to p rotect the natural world, 2
how does this come within that category of obligations we recog
nize as j ustice, for example, in the traditional Aristotelian sense of
an allocation of social goods, since it involves obligations to non. . "1 1
human ent1t1es:- 22
1 18

This is evidenced by several recent treaties such as the Basel Convention
and the Montreal Protocol. See, e.g. , Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22,
1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5 (1991), 28 I.L.M. 657; Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 1 6, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
1 19 Environmentalists' concerns include the fear that trade liberalization
principles such as national treatment will be used to override conflicting provi
sions 1ll statutory and treaty-based environmental protection measures, as m the
Tuna/Dolphin example, and that the principle of comparative advantage will
be used to legitimize a "race to the bottom" in terms of lax environmental pro
tection laws. See Daniel C. Esty, Unpacking the "Trade and Environment" Con
flict, 25 LAW & POL'Y lNT'L Bus. 1259, 1260-61 (1994) .
120
This includes the threat that legitimate protective devices which consti
tute exceptions to trade disciplines can easily oe deployed for illegitimate pro
tectionist purposes. See JACKSON, supra note 89, at 201 ; Roessler, supra note 2,
at 227. Additionally, there is a concern that permitting domestic measures de
signed to compensate for different levels of environmental regulations will un
dermine differences in comparative advantage resulting from sovereign policy
choices and constitute a form of meddling in states' environmental policies. See
generally Esty, supra note 1 19, at 1261-62 (providing a general summary of
trade-oriented concerns about environmental regulation).
There is also a concern that trade related environmental protection is not
the optimal tool for environmental protection, threatening to introduce new
and unproductive sources of conflict mto an already contentious trade commu
nity wtth little to show for it in either environmental protection or trade en
hancement. See Roessler, supra note 2, at 228.
1 2 1 Advocates of a human ethical obligation to protect the environment
have done so on a variety of �rounds. See generally RODERlCK F. NASH, THE
RIGHTS OF NATURE 121-60 (1989) (reviewing the historical development of
ethical theories affording rights to non-humans and the natural world) .
122
The classical concept of justice employed here-justice as Right Order
typically envisions Right Order as right relationships among human beings.
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The trade and environment debate does, in fact, raise issues
which can be considered to be justice issues, or issues involving
Right Order decisions . First, the broad Platonic vision of justice
as Right Order could be construed to include efforts to order the
relationships between human beings and the natural world ac
cording to what is Right. 1 2 3 Debates over the acceptable limits of
accommodation of one's ethical obligation to the environment in
the face of competing economic interests presuppose such an ex
tension. These debates also reflect a divergence between conse
quentialist approaches to this issue, such as utilitarianism, which
can j ustify no link at all or a weak or flexible one, 1 2 4 and non
consequentialist forms of moral reasoning, such as Kantian moral
ity and other forms of egalitarian liberalism, which reject this sort
of reasoning where ethical obligations to the environment are
concerned. For example, Richard Stewart argues that in evaluat
ing the competing interests at stake in the trade and environment
linkage, a utilitarian analysis based on Mill is more effective rather
than non-consequentialist forms of analysis, a position challenged
by Robert Housman explicitly on Kantian grounds. 1 2 5
Second, public decisions concerning environmental protection
can be seen as Aristotelian allocations of social benefits and bur
dens, in that such decisions inevitably involve the allocation of
rights and duties involving the scope of permitted environmental
activity. The "Environmental Justice" movement adopts this ap
proach, examining the extent to which the burdens of environ
mental regulation, and the costs of environmental degradation,

One may well ask if our obligation to act justly embraces duties to non-human
entities such as plant or animal species or ecosystems.
123
The effort to structure the human-nature relationship according to a
recognition or grant of legal rights in the natural world would be one example
of this view. See generally CHRISTO PHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE
STANDING? (1996) .
124 Consequentialist moral theories j udge the morality of actions solely ac
cording to the nature of their consequences. See ALAN DONAGAN, THE
THEORY OF MORALITY 190 (1977) . Utilitarianism is its "most persuasive and
most thoroughly investigated variety." !d. at 192.
125
See Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environ
ment, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1376-77 (1992) ; Richard B. Stewart , lnter
national Trade and Environment: Lessons From the Federal Experience, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1329, 1 332 (1992) . Cf Holly Doremus, Patching the A rk: Im
proving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 1 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 275-8 1
(1991) (arguing that utilitarian and deontological arguments for p reservation of
biological diversity differ in the scope of effective protection they j ustify) .
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are disproportionately borne by the disadvantaged, and treatm g
this as a problem of distributive justice . 12 6
The trade and human rights debate also raises difficult justice
problems. They are justice p roblems because they i nvolve the al
location of basic social goods such as rights, which in our tradi
tion are perhaps the most highly valued of all social goods. They
are difficult because they arise in a context of conflict over fun
damental values, as revealed by different states ' conceptions of in
dividual and 2:roup rights, 1 2 7 and different accounts of the place of
.
.
12
18
sueh ngh ts, 1 and t h e appropnate response to sue h con1fl"1cts, 9
within international economic law.
More specifically, the trade and human rights linkage involves
a debate over the effects of trade and trade law on the allocation
of human rights and on their effectiveness. 130 The most contro126

See generally Gerald Torres, Environmental justice: The Legal Meaning of
a Social Movement, 1 5 J.L. & CoM. 597 (1996) (surveying history of and objec
tions to the environmental justice concept) .
127
A key aspect of Western conceptions of justice is respect for fundamen
tal human rights. This commitment IS the basts for the tremendous p ost-war
develof ment of human rights protection within public international law. But
not al trading states share die same conception of human rights, whether
within the Western tradition or outside of it, and not all trading states share the
same view of how differences in human rights and the values they reflect should
be i�nored, accommodated or challenged in international economic relations.
28
There is some consensus concerning a core of individual economic
rights such as labor and employment rights, but no consensus as to how such
rights should be taken into account in trade relationships. See WTO Singapore
Ministerial Declaration, WT /MIN(96)/DEC/W (Dec. 13, 1996) ; 3 6 I.L.M. 2 1 8
(1997) (providing that the WTO affirms commitment to international labor
standards but eschews jurisdiction over trade and labor issues, suggesting ILO as
forum) . There is even less consensus with respect to non-economic human
rights and how such rights should figure into trade and integration systems. See
Stirling, supra note 2, at 1 , 8-13, 39-40.
129
Stirling notes that trade sanctions, paradoxically, are in principle the
most effective, and, in practice, often the least effective means of enforcmg hu
man rights, as their use is often resented by the target state and is at the same
time the subject of political manipulation by interest groups in sanctioning
states. See id. at 2-3 .
130
Trade agreements can require as a precondition a strengthened rule of
law within the trading partners' society, which can have an indirect systemic
effect on improving rights protection. Second, specific economically-related
rights such as the property rights of innovators can be linked to trade conces
sions. Third, trade concessions can be used as incentives to reward progressive
democratic governments, which can secure human rights reforms and even cre
ate more of a ground-swell for further reform. Fourth, trade sanctions can be
used as a weapon for ensuring compliance with human rights obligations
stemming from other non-economic agreements. Finally, the juridical aspect of
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versial form of trade-human rights linkage is the use of trade sanc
tions as a weapon for ensuring compliance with human ri �hts ob
ligations stemming from other non-economic agreements. 3 1 Are
we morally obligated to use trade agreements or trade concessions
to punish human rights violators through economic sanctions for
noncompliance with human rights conventions? At a minimum,
are we obligated to refrain from granting them trade concessions?
Is this a right use of trade?
First, consider the p osition against linkage, namely that trade
relationships with human rights violators ought to continue un
abated. It is not difficult to see why this course of conduct would
be considered morally questionable on its face, in that continued
trade has at least the appearance of contributing to the wealth and
economic power of the violators and, in fact, may lead directly to
their ability to carry out their repressive practices. 1 3 2 This view,
however, can be justified on several grounds. A utilitarian has no
difficulty in supporting relatively unrestricted trade, if he o r she is
convinced that the best road towards fuller rights protection in
the future is a moderately repressive open market regime in the
short term, or a policy of constructive engagement, as the Clinton
administration adopted in its China decision. 1 33 A utilitarian can
also justify completely unrestricted trade, on the grounds that
trade flows best when it flows freest, and future general welfare
increases are the best road to human rights.
In contrast, both egalitarian and libertarian approaches would
be opposed to a utilitarian analysis, measuring as it does the utility
of rights protection abroad, and our trade-related measures for
enhancing it, against the utility of permitting or ignoring rights
violations abroad, or of refraining from the potential domestic

trade agreements and integration systems, to the extent they themselves reflect
fundamental concepts of justice such as democratic participation and the rule of
law, can also strengthen the human rights climate in international law.
131
See id. at 42-45 (noting that a properly designed sanctions re_gime can be
an effective human rights tool) ; Alston, supra note 1 12, at 1 68-69 (noting that
the relative inefficacy of sanctions argues for more constructive system of ex
ante incentives) .
1 32
Witness the speed with which military equipment and military-oriented
exports are suspended even where the general link to human rights is resisted.
133 See Randall Green, Human R ights and Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates
for Product from the People's Republic of China, 17 U. PUG ET SOUND L. REV.
6 1 1 (1994) (arguing that supporting economic development in China through
MFN and other policies is the best way to promote human rights in China).
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trade-related costs of trade-oriented rights measures. 1 3 4 As with
the trade and environment linkage, the struggle underlying the
trade-human rights linkage may be between utilitarian approaches
to this issue, which can justify no link at all or a weak or flexible
one, and non-consequentialist forms of moral reasoning, such as
Kantian morality and other forms of egalitarian liberalism, which
.
.
. hts are concerned . 1 3 5
reJ ect t h"IS sort o f reasonmg
w h ere human ng

As with the trade and inequality link, the trade and human rights
link forces us to consider the consistency of our commitments,
specifically whether one can be an egalitarian liberal or libert arian
as far as rights issues at home go, and a utilitarian on rights issues
abroad.
3. 2.

Changing the Linkage Discourse

Despite the justice implications of the linkages discussed
above, linkage issues may not always be approached or even rec
ognized as justice questions. The dominant perspective of both
sides to any linkage issues tends towards what can be character
ized as the External View, in which each opposing camp on the
linkage issue views the other camps' claims and modes of analysis
as external to its own concerns and commitments . Within the
trade policy side, the External View is best represented by those
adhering to the Efficiency Model, trade theorists who view trade
law principally in economic terms as a matter of enhancing effi
ciency and the general welfare. 1 3 6 From the viewpoint of Effi
ciency Model adherents, the non-trade camp is seen as trying to
get in the way or "gum up the works" with what are at best ex
traneous concerns such as human rights or environmental protec-

134

One might even see a curious alignment between egalitarian and liber
tarian views on this point, as both theories place a fundamental emphasis on
individual rights and their protection as a cornerstone of a just society.
135
See Tes6n, supra note 61, at 64-65.
136
Adam Smith is the classical exponent of the view that the unimpeded
free market is the best guarantor of ultimate economic well-being. See KELLY,
supra note 63, at 303; SMITH, supra note 103 ; see also JACKSON, supra note 89, at
8-9 (naming efficiency-based increases in general welfare as the pre-eminent goal
of trade law) ; Robert E. Hudec, GA IT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade
Measures Against Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION, supra note 2, at 95, 108 ("The GATT's economic goal is to
promote, through liberal international trade policies, the greater effectiveness of
national economies.") .
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38

1
.
1 7 and w h at may b e at worst s1mp 1 e protectwmsm.
The
twn,
non-trade side of the External View can be represented by the
"Green'' movement in international trade, for whom the interna
tional economic law regime is seen as adversely affecting its efforts
to establish their vision of a just order with regard to the envi39
ronment . 1
Recognizing trade linkage questions as justice questions inevi
tably changes our approach to the trade linkage debates. First of
all, regarding the framework of the debate, the External view be
comes ultimately untenable, because trade policy cannot be con
sidered as independent of the concerns raised by the various trade
linkage debates. The alternative, or "Integrated View," suggested
by a j ustice perspective requires recognition of the fact that con
flicts between traditional trade policy and other areas of social
policy involve branches of the same tree, and that this tree is the
.
.
.
140
E nv1ronmenta1 an d h uman
constructiOn o f a JUSt society.
rights advocates, for example, cannot be viewed as b ounders or
gate crashers at the trade policy party. Rather, they raise funda
mental questions that are inescapable within trade policy, for they
raise questions of justice, and trade policy exists and operates
within the larger inquiry as to justice.
·

1 3 7 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 23 (citing objection by GATT and
WTO members to efforts in 1991 and 1994 to begin work on labor and envi
ronment issues, on the basis that such issues were not "trade issue[s]") ; Hudec,
supra note 136 (arguing that GATT has a good reason to be skeptical of linkage
claims) .
1 8
3
See Charnovitz, supra note 3 , at 32 ("Simplistic demands for drastic
trade remedies against so-called eco-dumping or soc1al dumping sometimes bear
a striking similarity to more conventional forms of protecuonist rhetoric . . . . ")
(citin� then-GATT Director General, Peter Sutherland) .
13
The outcry over the GATT Tuna-Dolphin dispute is a classic example
of this framework, in which the trade community's rules and fora are viewed
by the environmentalists as serious obstacles to the accomplishment of their
objectives, in that case the protection of dolphins through the United States
Marine Mammal Protection Act. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1 947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 1 87; GA 7T Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on U. S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 1 17. See generally
James Cameron, The GA 7T and the Environment, in PHILLIPE SANDS,
GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 00, 1 00-21 (1994) .
1 40 Recognizing the link between trade and j ustice means a recognition by
linkage partisans that their common search for justice binds them far more than
their different views divide them, and that each side is engaged in a search for
justice, and seeks to enact their vision of it in a given area of social concern.
The problem, of course, is that those areas of soc1al concern, in fact, overlap,
and each community may have conflicting visions of the Right Order and con
flicting criteria of justification of justice.
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Second, in answering linkage questions, we must consider the
implications of our various substantive theories of justice on each
of these issues . The fact that they are justice questions means that
the debate and resolution of trade linkage issues must include
comprehensive and systematic normative analysis, which is an es
sential part of how we answer any question involving social goals
and social values. 141 From a justice perspective, linkage debates
are not merely disputes over the accommodation by trade policy
of exogamous priorities, but rather involve disagreements at the
level of normative theory, over the proper construction of a just
society. Particular linkages such as "trade and inequality," "trade
and human rights," and "trade and the environment" present a se
ries of debates within and among substantive theories of justice,
and concerning the relationship of international economic law to
justice. The fact that there is disagreement reveals that , with re
gard to each particular area of social concern, we lack consensus as
to what, p recisely, the Right Order should be. 142
Rendering such normative conflicts more transparent is all the
more critical in view of the fact that the Efficiency M odel would,
at first glance, seem to stand outside the Justice question, suggest
ing explicitly or implicitly that it takes no position on j ustice
questions, and that considerations of justice (often read as distri
butional equity) have no place in trade law so understood. 1 4 3 This
Article has argued that trade linkage questions cannot be defini
tively resolved a-normatively, and that it is an error of the Effi-

14

1

See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that one similarity between
environmental and labor issues in trade is that "[m]orality has always been a
concern with labour(sic] and is becoming increasingly so with the environ
ment"). There are, of course, other ways of analyzing these issues which are
equallY,: important, such as the descriptive and prescriptive modes of the social
sctenufic tradition, which can complement, but not replace, a normative analy
sis or a normative answer.
1 42 Circumstances have changed; technology has advanced; international
economic law has developed; fundamental values are in conflict; and the range
of options for "rightly ordering" each of these corners of society is represented
more fully by the views of th.e trade and non-trade partisans taken together,
than by etther side separately.
143 Trade law, on this view, is about comparative advantage, efficiency, and
welfare. See, e.g. , Ronald Brand, Sustaining the Development of International
Trade Law, 2 1 VT. L. REV. 823, 842 (1997) ("The fundamental goal of the WTO
system is the reduction of trade barriers through rules consistent with the un
derlying theory of comparative advantage. ") .
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ciency Model to consider itself a convenient , neutral manner in
which to resolve these issues . There is no such stance. 1 44
In fact, when one considers the question of justice and its rela
tion to international economic law, as outlined above, one is im
mediately struck by the fact that the Efficiency Model of interna
tional economic law is actually one response to the question of
1
what constitutes the Right Order. 4 5 On this view of interna
tional economic relations, j ustice is best served through a system
of international economic law that promotes free market ex
changes among private parties and within the state "market" for
Such market exchanges will promote effi
trade agreements.
ciency, enable comparative advantage to operate, and enhance the
1
general welfare of the market participants. 4 6 Neoliberal eco
nomic arguments against linkages thus p resuppose a substantive
theory of j ustice. They are not neutral arguments to p reserve
trade policy from unwarranted normative baggage, but rather
normative arguments towards a different vision of the Right Or1
d er. 47
1 4 4 Trade linkage issues thus flush the neo-liberal economic trade viewpoint
out of its assumed neutrality and into the mudpit of normative brawling, where
it belongs.
145 Put another way, Efficiency Model advocates rely on the positive analy
sis of economists while ignoring the normative aspects of economic theory,
which I?�dern econo.�ists themselves take little cognizanc� of d�sp ite a histori
cal trad1t1on of theonzmg as to the proper ends of econom1c act1v1ty. See EDW.
E. ZAJAC, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 69-78 (1995) ; Daniel M.
Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Con
temporary Moral Philosophy, 3 1 T. ECON. LIT. 671 , 675-76, 677-78 (citing the
moral presuppositions and implications of welfare economics, and the mter
minp,ling of positive and normative analysis in such economics).
46 This view may reflect the conclusion that the only professional contri
bution economists can make to the justice debate is analysts of what contributes
to these modest but necessary ingredients in a just society. In that case, the po
sition is consistent with modern economics' eschewal of ethical theory beyond
their own methodological limits. See ZAJAC, supra note 145, at 76-77; Hausman
& McPher�on, surra note 145, at 67.1-78 (citing !llodern economists' relative ig
norance ot mora theory, and argmng for the 1mportance of moral theory to
effective economic analysis). However, it must oe recognized that efficiency
and welfare, while arguably necessary, are not sufficient, in themselves, to ex
press all our intuitions about just outcomes.
Alternatively, to the extent that this view is an assertion that efficiency is a
sufficient justification of outcomes, it runs counter to most liberal theory and
ignores the significant distributional issues raised by economic activity. See
Z.-\]AC, supra note 145, at 77.
147 The claims of justice, be it libertarian justice o r utilitarian justice, are
satisfied on this view solely through maximizmg individual economic liberty
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Finally, the articulation of trade linkage positions, in terms of
substantive theories of justice, makes it possible to recognize p o
tentially useful areas of agreement on a normative level among
differing linkage views . At its most basic level, international eco
nomic law and policy can be seen as committed to and advancing
key tenets of Western theories of justice in the area of economic
relations. For example, the core values of free trade and economic
integration (increases in general welfare through trade liberaliza
tion, nondiscrimination, and the implementation of treaty-based
regulatory schemes) reflect core principles of a liberal theory of
j ustice such as liberty, equality of oppo rtunity, and the rule of
law . 148 Thus, Efficiency Paradigm advocates and those with other
linkage viewpoints can find common ground, for example, in
trade linkage approaches that advocate measures which strengthen
the rule of law and the effectiveness of institutions in interna
tional economic relations as part of a linkage scheme .
3. 3.

Towards a just Resolution of Trade Linkage Issues

Recognizing the link between trade linkage issues and j ustice
can also contribute to a more just resolution of those linkage is
sues. It becomes possible to evaluate techniques and options for
resolving linkage conflicts in an analytic framewo rk that draws
out their underlying normative commitments and implications .
Various trade policy mechanisms have been developed by states
and international economic i nstitutions for managing conflicts
among linkage areas. 1 49 Efficiency alone is an inadequate basis o n
which t o formulate policy in areas which involve so many i nter
ests, costs, risks, and opportunities. 1 5° Furthermore, trade linkage

and minimizing governmental interference with market decisions, eschewing
the distributive or social justice contentions of liberal egalitarian justice .
148
Cf Petersmann, supra note 89, at 406 ("[I]ndividual liberties and action
able property rights are preconditions for the proper functioning of eco
nomic . . . markets, and for maximization of individual autonomy, human well
bein�, economic efficiency and social welfare in a free society.").
1 9 The current trade linkage debate is dominated by a bewildering variety
of issues and techniques, including rule-making issues such as harmonization,
domestic versus multilateral standards, and priority schemes for rule conflicts;
enforcement issues such as admission criteria, conditionality, suspension of
concessions and trade sanctions; and institutional issues including jurisdiction,
com�etence, participation by NGOs, debates over decision-making criteria.
0 See Dunoff, supra note 94; Nichols, supra note 7, at 707 ("[T]he multi
tude of efficient states cannot be narrowed to one by excising all goals except
maximization of monetary wealth.") .
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issues can not be resolved solely at the level of a choice of techni
cal or doctrinal tools . Techniques to manage these issues involve
prioritizing between certain trade liberalization values and other
aspects of the liberal view of justice, such as human rights. As
such, they contain deeply embedded normative assumptions,
which must be addressed as such. 1 5 1 A justice perspective may
thus serve both to put the quest for efficiency within a larger
normative context and to supplement this line of inquiry with a
more adequate framework for policy formulation.
One principal practical implication of a normative analysis of
trade linkage techniques would be that certain existing policies or
practices now considered to be discretionary on the part of the
implementing state could come to be seen as in fact obligatory, on
the basis of that state's moral obligations to its trading partners.
For example, in the trade and development area the pri nciple of
asymmetry or preferential treatment for developing countries is a
principal instrument in managing inequality problems, and is as
old as the GATT system. 1 52 However, much of the trade between
developed and developing countries is conducted under some
form of unilateral trade p reference program 1 53 which disfavors to
some degree exports of manufactured goods which are direct
competitive with the manufactured goods of developed states. 1 4

�

151

What is lacking today is a comprehensive analysis from the/ erspective
of the developed states of the ethical relationship between develope and devel
oping states, and the articulation of the implications of such an analysis for the
current trading system. This lack of consensus reflects debates, within the
West, on justice itself, as well as the debate within trade law between the Effi
ciencz Model and other models of economic justice.
1 2
The Havana Charter contained extensive provisions detailing preferen
tial treatment for industrializing developing countries. See Brown, supra note 2,
at 358-59. Unfortunately, the Havana Ch.arter never went into force; the re
sulting GATT had a much weaker regime for developing countries; and the
amendments adding part IV, in 1966, dia not fully remedy the situation. See id.
at 359.
1 5 3 In 197 1 , the GATT Contracting Parties approved a waiver authorizing,
but not requiring, developed states to extend preferential tariff rates to develop
ing country exports on a non-reciprocal basis for ten years. In 1979, the waiver
for the resulting Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") was made perma
nent. See id. at 362-63 . Most developed countries have some form of GSP pro
gram, including members of the European Community and the United States.
See, e-§", 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994) .
15
Despite its widespread implementation, the GSP effort is widely judged
a failure, as most often the exports of greatest interest to developing countries
are not covered, and the complexity and discretionary nature of the program
undermine its utility. See generally Brown, supra note 2, at 362-63.
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It may be that under some form of redistributive or feminist the
ory of justice one could articulate a moral obligation to permit
the preferential export of competitive goods . 1 5 5 Justice may also
require that such discretionary unilateral preferences be sup
planted by nondiscretionary bilateral treaty commitments for
.
.
pre ferentla1 treatment, 1 5 6 toget h er Wit h non- d'1scretwnary tra d erelated development aid, and other ways of recognizing inequality
.
m
. trade re1 atlons h'1ps . 1 57
A second, related effect would be that certain existing linkage
tools now considered legitimate, even attractive, might come to
be seen as unattractive or even unjust if normatively reevalu
ated. 15 8 For example, one linkage tool often employed and advo
cated in the human rights and environment debates is the practice
of trade conditionality, which in this context means linking trade
preferences and other advantageous trade treatment with adher
ence to certain values as reflected in a ropriate treaties involving
gp
This app roach is popular
the environment, human rights, etc. 1
.

155 For example, under the Rawlsian difference principle inequalities are to
be justified by their working to the advantage of the least favored, which would
mean, in this instance, that preferential or unequal trade treatment must be
structured to favor the interests of developing country exporters over devel
oped country competitors.
The ethic of care articulated by feminist philosophers, as applied to inter
national relations, might require a similar result. See Charlesworth et al., supra
note 1 1 1 , at 6 15-16.
156
Such a transition can play an important interim role in an evolving
process of regional integration. See Frank J. Garcia, "A merica 's A greements"
A n Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade A rea of the A mericas, 3 5 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 63 , at 98- 106 (1997) .
157 See Bernard Cullen, Philosophical Theories of Justice, in JUSTICE: IN
TERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1 2, at 28 (describing Barry's notion
that justice might require a non-discretionary system of interstate development
aid) .
158
One broad, systemic effect of a justice perspective on linkage issues
might be the elimination of certain options on die basis of a widespread rejec
tion of utilitarianism or consequentialtsm generally.
159 One example of this practice is the requirement that EC member and
associated states be parties to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom. See Smith, supra note 2, at 808-09.
Therefore, tf a state is to participate in European integration, it must recognize
certain human rights norms. The China MFN debate is a key example of this
issue, and of the failure of the Clinton administration to follow through on its
initial impetus to recognize and respect this link. See Robert S. Greenberger,
Restraint of Trade: Cacophony of Voices Drowns Out Message From U.S. to China,
WALL S T . J., Mar. 22, 1994, at Al. As a result, the liberal view of a just society
becomes further fragmented .
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with non-trade interest groups, as it suggests in the strongest pos
sible terms the conditioning state's commitment to the relevant
160
aspect of justice linked to the trade benefits in question .
This
approach is equally unpopular with the neoliberally-oriented
trade community, which sees such efforts as a serious threat to the
fundamental economic principles of trade theory and a stalking
horse for arbitrary discrimination.
The issue of trade conditionality is ideally suited for analysis
from a justice perspective. On this issue, the neoliberal economic
view of justice militates against conditionality on trade economic
grounds, but has no answer when faced with the assertion that
such a position undermines other commitments stemming equally
from a liberal view of justice, in that it enriches states pursuing
values contrary to our own. However, the facially liberal argu
ment in favor of conditionality seems to ignore that , at least with
respect to developing countries (often the most popular targets for
conditionality due to their relative vulnerability) , a wealthy state
might be under a moral duty to give preferential trade treatment
and even direct aid that might preclude conditionality alto gether.
In other words, if justice requires that wealthy states assist the de
velopment of poorer states through trade preferences and outright
wealth transfers, then conditionality would be a violation of that
moral duty] regardless of its possible advantages in the pursuit of
161
oth er atms.
The trade and environment link in particular has highlighted a
third area in which a j ustice perspective may have practical impli
cations, namely the issue of determining the proper forum and
decisional criteria for the institutional resolution of trade linkage
1 62
Institutional dispute settlement bodies confronted
conflicts.
.

160

See, e. g:., Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 22 (citing conditionality practices
with approval) .
16 1
Certain conditions tied to ensuring that the aid go where it is intended,
i.e., to benefit the lot of the poorest, might, of course, be justifiable. However,
links to rights not implicated in the subJect of the aid (free speech or free emi
gration rights, for exam2le) would not be justifiable, because they presume dis
cretion over the grant of assistance where that grant might, in fact, be a moral
obli ftation .
62 Environmentalists roundly criticized the GATT decision-making proc
ess in the first Tuna-Dolphin case, United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 30 _I.L.M.- 1 594 (�99 1), in which the fir�t . �xplicit trade lin�age issues W<l;S
resolved m an mternatwna1 legal forum, for ta1lmg to take cogmzance of envl
ronmental policy issues and for clumsily handling these matters in a piecemeal
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with linkage issues must be capable of making decisions that ad
dress the wide range of social values at stake. 163 To date, the
GATT, as a principal trade-based forum for handling linkage is
sues, has not passed the test, at least in the view of non-t rade link.
age mterest groups. 1 64
As a threshold matter, justice might require for example that
the forum chosen be one which most closely embodies our proce
dural standards for just decision making and dispute resolution. 1 6 5

In this respect, one key aspect already prominent i n trade policy
debates is participation by interest groups, an issue with clear
.
.
.
are
overtones o f democratlc t h eory. 1 66 0nee sue h mstltutwns
.
chosen, a justice perspective requires a careful analysis of the prin
ciples and criteria employed in making decisions involving link
age issues. 1 67 Normative preferences which may well predeter
mine the outcome of linkage decisions are likely to be embedded

fa<>hion. See, e.g. , Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defog
ging the Debate, 27 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 459 (1994) .
163
As Joel T rachtman writes, "[N]o society can afford to make decisions in
an unintegrated fashion." Trachtman, supra note 5, at 57. The risks for institu
tions such as the WTO in ignoring the fundamental values at stake in their de
cisions are highlighted by Philip Nichols in Trade Without Values. See Nichols,
supra note 7, at 702-07.
164
See, e.g. , ESTY, supra note 2, at 1268.
[T]he GATT stands as one of the most successful international o rgani
zations ever created. But the GATT's legitimacy does not translate out
of the trade context, and the organization has little credibility in envi
ronmental matters. When a case involves mixed issues of 'trade and
environment,' the GATT does not offer a suitable forum for resolu
tion of the dispute, as the institution lacks the expertise and neutrality
to balance trade and environmental J?Olicies. The GATT's perceived
lack of technical capacity and neutralny, and therefore legitimacy, as a
decision-making body in the environmental realm presents a nearly in
surmountable obstacle to peace in the war between environmentalists
and free traders.
!d. But see Stewart, supra note 125, at 1 349 ("While amendments to the GATT
to deal more specifically with trade and environment issues may well be desir
able, the current GATT text provides sufficient flexibility to afford environ
mental values equal footing w.lth free trade values.") .
165
See Petersmann, supra note 89.
166
See Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision
Making, 27 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 699 (1994) .
167
See generally Joel P. Trachtman, "Trade and . . . " Problems, Cost-Benefit
A nalysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 32 (1997) .
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. tne
'
F or examp 1 e, 1t h as b een argue d t.1h at m
in such cntena.
analysis of GATT dispute settlement involving trade-environment
issues, certain criteria such as "proof of endangerment" mask utili
tarian assumptions tending to favor pro-trade outcomes to such
.
169 d1sputes .
•

·

·

4.

CONCLUSION

In any successful revolution, there comes a moment of truth
when the former revolutionaries must finally confront the chal
lenge of governance, and the international economic law revoiu
tion is no different. The trade linkage phenomenon, in particular,
is forcing international economic law to wrestle with its own
normative assumptions and implications across a broad range of
issues. One should expect no less of a system of governance that
so promises to affect all aspects of global social policy.
Successfully managing trade linkage issues means, for the trade
policy community, accepting that t he linkages come from within
and not from without. Even if o ne maintains the neoliberal eco
nomic view of justice in international economic law, it must at
least be conceded that advocates of linkage issues are acting from
other answers to the same question, the question of justice, and
that it is a shared question.
Furthermore, the resolution of linkage issues cannot be sought
exclusively on the doctrinal level. The resolution needs to be ar
ticulated normatively, as an attempt to resolve dilemmas and ten
sions within the liberal vision, and between liberalism and other
candidates for Right Order. From the perspective of justice, the
debate within international economic law over linkage issues re
flects debates within various aspects of Western moral and politi
cal theory, and especially within liberalism itself. It reflects ten
sions between the liberalization of individual choice through free
trade and investment, and the commitment to individual rights
and other fundamental moral obligations expressed in other as-
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See Nichols, supra note 7, at 700-01 (reviewing factors in GATT dispute
settlement panel doctrine giving primacy to trade in conflicts with other val
ues) .
169 "Endangerment" implies that there is no harm short of dire peril that
could justify interference with economically lucrative activity, ignoring the
possibility that any harm, for example, justifies such interference. See
Housman, supra note 125, at 1 376-77 (challenging Stewart) .
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pects of liberalism, such as human rights and environmental pro
tectwn .
The ideal solution would be consensus on the question of
what justice demands in the case of international economic law
generally, and for each linkage area in question. Absent that, one
must resort to legal techniques for managing linkages where con
sensus is not achieved, but always with the understanding that
one is mediating local conflicts within an overall search for j us
tice.
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